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ARGUMENT 
 
The District Court Erred By Reversing The Magistrate’s Ruling On The Motion To 
Suppress Because The Facts Supported The Magistrate’s Conclusion That 
There Was Reasonable Suspicion To Believe King Was Driving Under The 
Influence And Because There Was Reasonable Suspicion That She Was Driving 
Inattentively 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The magistrate applied the totality of the circumstances test and 
concluded that King’s driving pattern of passing through “at least two” 
intersections with her turn signal on without turning provided reasonable 
suspicion that she was driving under the influence.  (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – p. 22, 
L. 7.)  The district court reversed, holding that “driving patterns that are merely 
unusual or irregular but not illegal do not justify a suspicion to support a traffic 
stop” for DUI and that driving through multiple intersections with a turn signal on 
did not constitute reasonable suspicion of inattentive driving.  (R., pp. 76-81.)  
The district court erred because application of the correct legal standards to the 
facts supports reasonable suspicion of both DUI and inattentive driving.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-11.) 
 
B. The District Court Applied An Erroneous Legal Standard When It 
Required Suspicion Of An Illegality In Addition To DUI To Conduct A 
Traffic Stop 
 
 Traffic stops “are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable 
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a 
crime.”  State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442, 362 P.3d 514, 517 (2015).  “Thus 
there are two possible justifications for a traffic stop—the officer has reasonable 
suspicion that a driver has committed an offense, such as a traffic offense, or the 
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officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, such as driving under 
the influence.”  Id.   
Reasonable suspicion of DUI is present if the officer “was in possession of 
facts giving rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle’s driver 
was intoxicated.”  State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 
(Ct. App. 1996).  “In determining whether a reasonable suspicion existed at the 
time of the stop, the proper inquiry is to look at the totality of the circumstances 
and ask whether the facts available to the officers at the time of the stop gave 
rise to a reasonable suspicion, not probable cause to believe, that criminal 
activity may be afoot.”  State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 599, 887 P.2d 1102, 1106 
(Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotes and citations omitted).  “Reasonable suspicion 
requires less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the 
part of the officer.”  State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675 
(Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted).  Moreover, an officer may rely on his training 
and experiences to draw inferences that might elude an untrained person.  
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 
180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004).  The inference that King may be under 
the influence of alcohol, drawn by Sergeant Lathrop with his training and 16 
years of experience from the circumstances underlying this traffic stop, including 
the time and King’s driving pattern, was reasonable. 
 On appeal King claims Sergeant Lathrop lacked reasonable suspicion of 
DUI because her driving “‘can be described as normal driving behavior.’”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7 (citing State v. Emory, 119 Idaho 661, 664, 809 P.2d 
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522, 525 (Ct. App. 1991)).1  The flaw in this argument is that King’s driving 
behavior cannot be accurately described as normal, much less so normal that an 
officer with Sergeant Lathrop’s experience could not, under the totality of the 
circumstances, reasonably suspect she may have been driving under the 
influence. At a minimum King was confused, distracted or inattentive, and 
suspicion that alcohol may have been the reason for any of those things was 
reasonable.  King’s contention that there might be an innocent explanation for 
her driving (Appellant’s brief, p. 9 (driving through multiple intersections with the 
turn signal activated “can just as easily be explained as the driver not knowing 
which street to turn onto”) neither renders her driving “normal” nor negates 
reasonable suspicion.  United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“A 
determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the 
possibility of innocent conduct.”); State v. Rader, 135 Idaho 273, 276, 16 P.3d 
949, 952 (Ct. App. 2000) (“the existence of alternative innocent explanations of 
the circumstances does not negate the fact that the officer had a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime might have been committed”). 
 The district court’s holding that “driving patterns that are merely unusual or 
irregular but not illegal do not justify a suspicion to support a traffic stop” applied 
an erroneous legal standard.  (R., p. 76.)  King’s claim that signaling a turn three 
                                            
1 King argues that the “normal driving behavior” standard was applied by the 
district court.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)  The district court specifically held that 
“driving patterns that are merely unusual or irregular but not illegal do not justify 
a suspicion to support a traffic stop.”  (R., p. 76 (emphasis added).)  King’s 
contention that the district court did not require an illegal driving pattern is 
contrary to the plain language employed by the district court. 
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or more blocks in advance is a “normal driving behavior” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-
12) is meritless.  The magistrate applied the correct legal standard and reached 
the correct result that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to suspicion that 
King may have been driving under the influence at the time of the traffic stop.  
The district court therefore erred in reversing.   
 
C. The District Court Also Erred When It Concluded That Sergeant Lathrop 
Lacked Reasonable Suspicion Of Inattentive Driving 
 
 Sergeant Lathrop had reasonable suspicion that King was driving 
inattentively when she drove through at least two intersections with her turn 
signal on but without turning.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-11 (citing I.C. § 49-101(3); 
I.C.J.I. 1031; Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 435, 958 P.2d 592, 592 (1998)).  
The district court erred in holding otherwise. 
 On appeal King argues that an officer does not have reasonable suspicion 
of inattentive driving, apparently as a matter of law, until he observes a motorist 
go through three intersections with an active turn signal but not turning.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.)  In this case Sergeant Lathrop testified he saw 
King drive through three intersections.  (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 11-21.)  The magistrate 
found she had driven through “at least two” intersections (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – 
p. 21, L. 19), which does not exclude three.  Even if King were correct, and there 
is a bright line rule requiring three intersections, the magistrate’s factual findings 
do not exclude three intersections so, at best, King would be entitled to a remand 
to resolve an outstanding factual question.  King’s argument does not show the 
district court correctly reversed the order denying suppression. 
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 King next argues that seeing her eventually turn dissipated reasonable 
suspicion because it shows she meant to signal her turn more than two blocks 
ahead, rather than being inattentive.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 16-17 (evidence she 
turned “shows that the signal was simply early in time”).)  This argument fails, 
first because King again makes the erroneous argument that an innocent 
explanation of the evidence necessarily negates reasonable suspicion and, 
second, because intentionally driving multiple blocks with a blinking turn signal is 
not even a truly innocent explanation.  That she eventually made a turn did not 
dissipate the officer’s reasonable suspicion that she drove inattentively prior to 
making the turn.2  The district court erroneously concluded Sergeant Lathrop 
lacked reasonable suspicion that King was driving inattentively.  
 
                                            
2 King also argues that the stop violated her rights under the Idaho Constitution.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 17-18.)  King did not claim in the magistrate division that 
the Idaho Constitution granted greater rights against search and seizure than the 
Fourth Amendment.  (R., pp. 17-22; Tr., p. 15, L. 17 – p. 18, L. 10.)  Even if this 
argument were preserved, King has presented no reason why reasonable 
suspicion of DUI or inattentive driving would be inadequate to justify a traffic stop 
under the Idaho Constitution.  State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 
961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999) (Court will not interpret state constitution differently 
from corresponding provisions of federal constitution unless given a “cogent 
reason”). 
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CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and 
reinstate the judgment of the magistrate.  
 DATED this 17th day of November, 2016. 
 
          /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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